Lessons from the East European Financial Crisis, 2008-10 by Anders Aslund
N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 9   j u Ne  2 0 1 1
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW   Washington, DC 20036   Tel 202.328.9000   Fax 202.659.3225   www.piie.com
Policy Brief
Lessons from the East 
European Financial Crisis, 
2008–10
Anders Åslund
Anders Åslund is a leading specialist on postcommunist economic trans-
formation with more than 30 years of experience in the field. He is the 
author of 11 books and the editor of 16. Among his recent books are How 
Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy (2009), Russia’s 
Capitalist Revolution (2007), and How Capitalism Was Built (2007). 
He  has  also  published  widely,  including  in  Foreign  Affairs,  Foreign 
Policy, National Interest, New York Times, Washington Post, Financial 
Times, and Wall Street Journal. Åslund joined the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics as senior fellow in 2006. He has worked as an 
economic adviser to the Russian government (1991–94), to the Ukrainian 
government  (1994–97),  and  to  the  president  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic. 
Before joining the Peterson Institute he was the director of the Russian 
and  Eurasian  Program  at  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International 
Peace, and he codirected the Carnegie Moscow Center’s project on Post-
Soviet Economies. Previously, he served as a Swedish diplomat in Kuwait, 
Geneva, Poland, Moscow, and Stockholm. From 1989 until 1994, he was 
professor and founding director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition 
Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics. He earned his doctorate 
from the University of Oxford.
© Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved.
In the fall of 2008, Central and Eastern Europe became a 
flashpoint in the global financial crisis. The ten new eastern 
members of the European Union were in a state of severe 
overheating in all regards. Inflation surged everywhere and 
to double digits in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
Wages  and  real  estate  prices  skyrocketed,  rendering  these 
countries  ever  less  competitive,  which  further  undermined 
their current account balance. Output plunged and unem-
ployment soared. 
The two countries with the greatest overexpansion, Latvia 
and Estonia, were feeling a credit crunch already in 2007, 
as  their  banks  reduced  their  lending,  leading  to  a  sudden 
and sharp fall in real estate prices. As a consequence, both 
consumption and investment plummeted, and thus output. 
The  ensuing  credit  losses  threatened  the  sustenance  of  the 
banking system. 
The  financial  crisis  was  already  well  advanced,  when 
the big blow occurred: the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on 
September 15, 2008. All of a sudden, world liquidity dried up, 
and vulnerable Eastern Europe faced a “sudden stop,” being 
left with no credit or liquidity.1
The East European financial crisis was a standard credit 
boom-and-bust cycle leading to a current account crisis. There 
is little to say in defense of the overheating and the policies that 
bred it. Yet loose monetary policy was a global phenomenon 
and it was difficult for these small and very open economies to 
defend themselves against abundant capital inflows.
The positive surprise, however, is that after about two 
years, in the second quarter of 2010, the crisis in the region 
had more or less abated. Public attention moved from Latvia, 
Estonia, and Lithuania—the three countries that had suffered 
the  biggest  output  contraction—to  the  PIIGS  (Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain), in particular to Greece. The 
issue was no longer why Latvia must devalue but what Greece 
could learn from Latvia. 
What lessons can be drawn from the resolution of the 
financial crisis in Eastern Europe for the rest of the European 
Union and the world at large? What happened during the 
East  European  financial  crisis,  and  how  was  it  resolved  so 
quickly?  This  policy  brief  aims  to  bring  home  the  lessons 
from this episode before it fades from public memory, because 
nothing is more easily taken for granted than success. I shall 
avoid unnecessary statistics and focus upon relevant policy 
conclusions.
Crisis  resolution  in  these  countries  was  decisive  and 
successful, and the entire region save Romania had returned 
to economic growth by the second half of 2010. At that time, 
the stabilization program of the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Union with Hungary had ended and the 
program Romania was replaced with a precautionary program 
in March 2011, while Latvia’s program continues but success-
fully so. Overall, the output contraction has been great, in N u m b e r   Pb11 - 9   ju N e  2 0 1 1
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particular in the Baltics, while Poland saw no contraction in 
any single quarter (figure 1).
The lessons from this crisis are many and in this brief I 
focus on 18 of them, which are drawn from my two recent 
books.2 Some may seem obvious, while others are not. The 
Central and East European countries, and especially the Baltic 
countries,  have  proven  that  much  old  wisdom  sometimes 
forgotten still holds. 
No country changed exchange rate policy. One of the 
most striking outcomes of the East European crisis is that 
none  of  the  four  countries  with  pegged  exchange  rates—
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Estonia,  and  Bulgaria—were  forced  to 
devalue contrary to claims by a broad chorus of economists. 
Instead, these countries pursued what they called “internal 
devaluation,” cutting wages and public expenditures, which 
rendered their cost levels competitive and allowed them to 
turn their large current account deficits swiftly into substan-
tial surpluses. Not one single country in the region changed 
exchange rate policy during the crisis, underlining that both 
inflation  targeting  and  pegs  remain  viable  exchange  rate 
policies.
Great  integration  renders  devaluation  ineffective.  A 
corollary is that depreciation is a much over-advertised cure in 
current macroeconomic discourse. Regardless of exchange rate 
policy, monetary policy and bank regulation, no small open 
economy can safeguard itself against sudden capital inflows 
and  outflows.  Large  currency  mismatches  are  inevitable  in 
small and open market economies with many currencies. No 
bank regulation is strong enough to take care of that, and if 
it were, banking could just migrate to a neighboring country. 
In early 2009, one of the greatest concerns was that the Polish 
banks would go under because of sharp depreciation of the 
Polish  zloty  and  large  currency  mismatches.  A  substantial 
depreciation  causes  large  balances  sheet  losses,  especially 
hurting banks. 
It made little sense for countries with far-reaching euroiza-
tion to devalue. Any devaluation would be huge, because the 
local currency was used for few purposes, rendering all local 
currency markets very thin. The blow to state finances, the stan-
dard of living of the population, and the banks would be great, 
because local currency was mainly used for tax payments, wage 
payments and retail transactions. The absence of devaluation 
salvaged the banking system in the worst exposed countries. 
The beneficiaries would be limited to large exporters, and also 
their benefits would not last for long, as the pass-through of 
inflation inevitably would be large, because commodity prices 
are international and many international enterprises set the 
same prices for the region rather than individual countries. 
Moreover, a devaluation could only be forced by a combina-
tion of a bank run and a currency run by ordinary citizens.
The  prosaic  conclusion  is  that  different  exchange  rate 
policies  offer  varied  risks,  and  that  each  country  needs  to 
make its individual choice of risks. Devaluation poses risks of 
large bank crashes and bankruptcies, while a pegged exchange 
rate entices excess capital inflows before a crisis. Estonia ran a 
persistent large budget surplus of about 2 percent of GDP in 
the good years from 2003until 2007, but even so it suffered a 
total GDP decline of 19 percent, showing that no fiscal policy 
can salvage an economy from external financial crisis. During 
a crisis, a pegged exchange rate compels a country to carry 
out more reforms, while devaluation often amounts to a post-
ponement of reforms. Which policy causes the greatest cost is 
not evident. 
A series of recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
papers show the new openness—or confusion. One empirical 
study  argues  that  intermediate  exchange  rate  regimes  have 
generated the best growth performance.3 Another paper shows 
that exchange rate flexibility helped buffer the impact of the 
crisis.4 During the boom years, the currency board countries 
in Eastern Europe had better fiscal balance and higher growth 
than the countries with floating exchange rates, and the Baltic 
cases show that internal devaluation is a viable option.5 The 
pragmatic wisdom from the early 1990s has been restored: 
There is no universally preferred exchange rate policy. The best 
choice depends on the concrete circumstances of the country 
in question.6
No risk of deflationary cycle in a small open economy. 
The international economic literature warned about the risk 
of a deflationary cycle ensuing after severe wage and budget 
Box 1     Countries in Focus
This policy brief focuses on the ten new eastern members 
of the European Union: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (the three 
Baltic  countries),  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia (the five Central European countries), 
Romania, and Bulgaria (Southeastern Europe). Bulgaria and 
Romania acceded to the European Union in January 2007. 
The other eight joined in May 2004.
Slovenia  and  Slovakia  adopted  the  euro  in  2007  and 
2009, respectively. Estonia successfully adopted the euro 
on January 1, 2011. Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria have 
fixed  exchange  rates  based  on  currency  boards,  and 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania have 
floating  exchange  rates  and  essentially  pursue  inflation 
targeting.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 9   j u Ne  2 0 1 1
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cuts  in  crisis  countries.7  The  evidence  shows  that  no  such 
risk existed. In Latvia, public wages fell by an average of 26 
percent in 2009, and private wages by 8 percent. Unit labor 
costs in manufacturing declined by 21 percent from mid-2008 
until end-2009 (figure 2). Even so average deflation in 2010 
over 2009 was merely 1.1 percent, and by the end of 2010, 
Latvia had annualized inflation of 2.5 percent.8 The explana-
tion is that the prices in these small open economies were 
given by adjacent markets to such an extent that inflationary 
pass-through eliminated all risks of deflationary cycles and 
rendered devaluation ineffective. 
The goal of euro accession is valuable. Euro accession 
as a goal is beneficial in at least three ways. First, it disciplines 
the  policy  especially  of  the  four  countries  with  currency 
boards. Their desire for full European integration with early 
adoption  of  the  euro  led  them  to  focus  on  two  nominal 
anchors: a fixed exchange rate and a budget deficit below 3 
percent of GDP, in their ambition to accede to the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) as early as possible. These two 
anchors brought stability and clarity to their economic policy. 
Second, for small, fast-growing countries on the European 
periphery, higher market interest rates than in the eurozone 
were natural, and only the Czech Republic had low interest 
rates in comparison with the eurozone. Then, it is cheaper 
in nominal terms to borrow in euro, and euroization with 
ensuing currency mismatches was close to inevitable for these 
open economies with no capital regulation. The only sensible 
way to reduce currency risks and currency mismatches is to 
adopt the euro. Finally, only membership in the EMU would 
provide these economies with the full liquidity support of the 
European Central Bank.
International liquidity is crucial. After the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, global credit 
froze. Access to liquidity was key to escaping deep recession. 
The US Fed performed a very important service by offering 
swap loans to a large number of countries around the world.9 
The European Central Bank (ECB), on the contrary, hardly 
provided any swap loans, save to Sweden and Denmark long 
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Figure 1     GDP Development in Central and Eastern Europe, 2000–11 (percent annual growth)
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after the height of the crisis. The new eastern EU members 
were  left  without  access  to  liquidity  other  than  their  own 
central  banks  and  their  trading  partners  were  prepared  to 
offer. The ECB did nothing to stabilize the economies of these 
euro candidate countries. It could have offered swap credits to 
eastern EU economies outside the euro area, but it did not.10 
Slovenia and Slovakia were lucky to be in the eurozone already 
and benefited from ECB’s ample liquidity. Those that suffered 
the most were small countries outside the eurozone, notably, 
the Baltic countries. Because of the extraordinary dearth of 
liquidity, national savings ratios skyrocketed – in Latvia from 
20 percent of GDP in 2008 to 31 percent of GDP in 2009, 
explaining most of the decline of output.11
Large and early international assistance is vital. The 
scarcity  of  liquidity  rendered  early  and  big  international 
financial assistance vital. Given the very low levels of public 
debt before the crisis in all countries but Hungary, the East 
European financial crisis was essentially a liquidity crisis and 
not a solvency crisis, and that was evident from the outset. 
Consequently,  the  international  community  should  follow 
Walter Bagehot’s adviseto lend freely but demand collateral 
in the midst of the crisis. Traditionally, the IMF has rarely 
given a country more than three times its quota with the IMF, 
but it gave Latvia 12 times its quota in credits. In hindsight, 
it  appears  strange  that  anybody  was  concerned  about  the 
IMF giving a country like Latvia such large credits, or that 
the international finance package to Latvia amounted to 37 
percent of its GDP in 2008. Great globalization means that 
larger volumes of credits will be needed. Instead more of the 
credit should have been given earlier to avoid the sharp output 
contraction, and other countries, primarily Lithuania, could 
have  benefited  from  international  financial  support,  but  it 
feared intrusive demands for devaluation.
New cooperation between the IMF and the EU worked 
well. As is usually the case in a financial crisis, the IMF took 
the lead in the international rescue efforts. It had learned its 
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Figure 2     Latvia’s consumer price index, gross wages and construction prices,  2004–10 (percent change over the
  corresponding period of the previous year)
percent
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lessons from the East Asian crisis in 1997–98. It revived the 
old  Washington  Consensus  of  a  few  rudimentary  financial 
conditions, such as tenable exchange rate policy and reasonable 
fiscal and monetary policy, but abandoned multiple structural 
demands.  In  addition,  it  allowed  well-governed  countries 
larger public deficits during the crisis and offered much more 
financing, also for budgets, than before with the understanding 
that this was a temporary current account crisis. It acted even 
faster than usual. The European Commission entered into a 
partnership with the IMF in Eastern Europe. It let the IMF 
take the lead, while providing substantial financing, more than 
the IMF in the case of Latvia, and it checked the work of the 
IMF. For the recipient countries, it was an advantage to have 
two parties to deal with, avoiding possible arbitrariness of IMF 
staff. In July 2009, the European Commission disbursed funds 
to Latvia when the IMF held back. 
The source of financing matters. One of the least relevant 
pre-crisis indicators was foreign indebtedness. Even the current 
account deficit said surprisingly little about the risk of finan-
cial crisis. The case in point is Bulgaria, which had the biggest 
current account deficit of all of 25 percent of GDP in 2007 
and a foreign debt exceeding its GDP. Even so, Bulgaria did 
not suffer more than other European countries during the crisis. 
The dominant explanation is that Bulgaria had huge net foreign 
direct  investment  that  financed  the  whole  current  account 
deficit. This runs counter to Guillermo Calvo’s view: “Large 
current account deficits are dangerous independently on how 
they are financed.”12
Foreign-owned banks have proven beneficial. Foreign-
owned banks have been a major bone of contention in Eastern 
Europe, where about 80 percent of banking assets belong to 
foreign-owned banks. Foreign investors preferred to buy large 
banks with significant market power in Eastern Europe, which 
were on average less profitable but better capitalized than banks 
that remained domestically owned.13 With access to cheaper 
funding than local banks, they became more profitable than 
domestic banks over time,14 which made them committed to 
stay. About one dozen West European banks have specialized 
on Eastern Europe, both inside and outside the EU. They have 
rightly been blamed for having lent too much in the good times, 
but they were also the first to sense the impending crisis and 
reduced their loan expansion starting in mid-2007. In the midst 
of the crisis, credit shrank considerably throughout the world, 
as only some central banks could expand liquidity. The ECB 
expanded its credit supply to salvage the European banking 
system in the fall of 2008, also propping up their subsidiaries in 
Eastern Europe. Without foreign-owned banks, Eastern Europe 
would not have had access to this important lifeline. Tellingly, 
the only significant bank in Eastern Europe that went under was 
Parex Bank in Latvia, which was the domestically-owned bank 
with the largest market share, financing itself with credits from 
the short-term European wholesale markets that froze during 
the crisis. Amazingly, not one foreign bank withdrew from any 
eastern country during the crisis, and they steeled themselves 
bearing substantial losses themselves. Today after the crisis, inte-
grated international banks appear advantageous, but effective, 
pan-European bank regulation is needed.15 
Bank  collapses  have  been  minimal.  Apart  from  Parex 
Bank, no significant bank has gone bankrupt in any of the 
eastern  EU  countries.  There  are  three  explanations  to  this 
surprising tenacity. First, leverage was limited in all these coun-
tries, and toxic assets such as credit debt obligations were basi-
cally not allowed by national bank regulators. Second, thanks 
to the absence of devaluation in the worst hit countries, the 
balance sheet losses were contained. Third, for the big West 
European banks these losses were bearable. As a consequence, 
the public cost of bank losses has been far smaller than antici-
pated. While the IMF initially expected bank losses amounting 
to 15 to 20 percent of GDP in Latvia, they have been limited 
to some 5 percent in 2008–09, essentially the initial cost for 
the recapitalization of Parex Bank.16 Moreover, this is a gross 
cost, much of which may be recovered when the government 
eventually sells Parex Bank. 
Distinguish between public and private debt! The point 
is often made that if debts are excessive, it does not matter in 
the end if they are public or private, because private debts tend 
to become public in a crisis.17 But the nationalization of private 
debt is not necessary, and the East European countries largely 
avoided it. After the crisis, private foreign debt remains consid-
erable  in  many  countries,  but  it  can  be  refinanced  without 
significant problems. As before the crisis, only Hungary exceeds 
the Maastricht public debt limit of 60 percent of GDP, while 
the average in the eurozone is 80 percent of GDP. 
Equally laudable was the political economy of this crisis. 
Instead of widely predicted social unrest, the East European 
public has accepted their considerable hardship with minimal 
protests.  Multiple  factors  contributed  to  social  peace.  Large 
majorities favored wage cuts over devaluation as the lesser evil, 
because the benefits of devaluations would mainly accrue to 
wealthy exporters. After many years of high economic growth, 
people  were  prepared  for  some  suffering.  These  states  had 
recently become free and were prepared to stand up for their 
nations, and they were all used to crisis from the postcommu-
nist transition.
Radical, early and comprehensive adjustment is benefi-
cial. As the global financial crisis hit the United States, President 
Barack  Obama’s  chief  of  staff  Rahm  Emmanuel  made  the 
pointed statement: “A crisis is a terrible thing to waste.” This is N u m b e r   Pb11 - 9   ju N e  2 0 1 1
6
born out by a substantial academic literature that crisis often 
offers opportunities for profound changes.18 In particular, the 
Baltic countries lived up to that wisdom. All three carried 
out fiscal adjustment of close to 10 percent of GDP in 2009 
alone. Their experience of fiscal adjustment has brought out 
the universal advantages of carrying out as much of the belt-
tightening as possible early on. Hardship is best concentrated 
to a short period, when people are ready for sacrifice, what 
Leszek Balcerowicz calls a period of “extraordinary politics.”19 
The  Balts  succeeded  because  they  concentrated  the  fiscal 
adjustments to the first year of crisis combat. Later rounds of 
belt-tightening have been more limited but politically more 
cumbersome.
Expenditure cuts are preferable to tax hikes. The logic is 
simple. During a crisis people understand that the government 
cannot do as much as before, while they find it more difficult 
to understand why they should pay more taxes for less public 
services or why the state would not tighten its belts as much as 
they do. The Baltic experience with more than three-quarters 
of the fiscal adjustment from public expenditure cuts shows 
that they are politically preferable to tax hikes20 (figure 3). It 
remains to be seen, but it is likely that the expenditure cuts 
will also promote faster growth in the future. Alberto Alesina 
and Silvia Ardagna have offered substantial statistical evidence 
for the thesis that “fiscal adjustments…based upon spending 
cuts and no tax increases are more likely to reduce deficits and 
debt over GDP ratios than those based upon tax increases.”21
Internal devaluation is possible and viable. A strange 
myth  has  evolved  that  affluent  democracies  are  politically 
unable to undertake large cuts in public expenditures and wages 
in evident ignorance of the big fiscal adjustments that Finland 
and Sweden carried out in the early 1990s. Latvia, as well as its 
Baltic neighbors, showed that these vibrant democracies were 
perfectly capable of reducing their public expenditures by about 
one-tenth of GDP in one year, 2009. Social calm prevailed. 
Since these large cuts had to be selective, they facilitated struc-
tural reforms, not only reducing the capacity but also often 
improving the quality of public services. The cuts made possible 
reforms of public administration, health care and education, 
most of which had been long prepared but previously been 
deemed politically impossible.
Equity is important. The most popular budget adjust-
ments were the cuts of salaries and benefits of senior civil 
servants and state enterprise managers as well as the reduc-
tion in public service positions. The Latvian prime minister 
accepted  a  salary  cut  of  35  percent.  The  most  unpopular 
measure was the value-added tax (VAT) hike, and resistance 
was fierce against raising income and profit taxes. Six of the 
ten  eastern  EU  members  had  flat  income  taxes  before  the 
crisis, and none of them has abandoned such taxes, while the 
Czech Republic has introduced them, and Hungary is intent 
on doing so.
Populism is not very popular in a serious crisis. This 
is the bottom line because the population understands the 
severity of the crisis and wants a government that can handle 
the crisis as forcefully as is necessary. The crisis has augured 
the biggest strength of the liberal center-right in this part of 
the world ever. In the elections to the European Parliament 
in June 2009, in the midst of the crisis, center-right parties 
won a majority in all the ten eastern EU members, and all but 
Slovenia currently have center-right governments. Two of the 
most ardent anticrisis governments, the Latvian and Estonian, 
won parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2011, respectively, 
while  parties  with  similar  programs  won  elections  in  the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia in the spring of 2010. Voters 
have  rationally  chosen  parties  that  have  appeared  to  have 
a realistic crisis resolution to offer. The big losers in recent 
elections, with the exception of Hungary in 2010, have been 
parties that have tried to exploit populism.
The one big failure has been the reversal of pension 
reform. An oddity of this crisis—exactly as in the early post-
communist transformation—is that the share of GDP going 
to pensions has risen sharply. Moreover, public pensions have 
expanded  at  the  expense  of  private  pension  schemes. Two 
governments—in Latvia and Romania—tried to cut pensions, 
but  these  decisions  were  reversed  by  their  Constitutional 
Courts.  Several  countries—Hungary,  Latvia,  Poland  and 
Romania—  have  reduced  the  funding  of  private  cumula-
tive pension schemes and used these funds to finance public 
pensions. Meanwhile, the value of private pension funds have 
plummeted with stock prices, and rendered them less popular. 
Hungary has even nationalized private pension funds.
International macroeconomics failed. The international 
macroeconomic discussion was of little use and even harmful. 
Whenever a crisis erupted anywhere, a choir of famous inter-
national economists claimed that it was “exactly” like some 
other recent crisis—the worse the crisis, the more popular 
the parallel. When the Icelandic economy blew up in early 
As the global financial crisis hit 
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October 2008, a herd of economists claimed that the same 
would  happen  to  Latvia,  although  Iceland  had  a  floating 
exchange rate, a high interest rate, and an overblown domestic 
banking system. Soon, prominent economists led by New York 
Times columnist Paul Krugman claimed that “Latvia is the 
new Argentina.”22 A fundamental problem is their reliance on 
a brief list of “stylized facts,” never bothering to find out the 
real facts and therefore suggesting policies poorly adjusted to 
the actual problem.
The financial crisis in Eastern Europe has been remark-
able for everything that did not happen. There was no signifi-
cant reaction against globalization, capitalism, the European 
Union, or the euro. No major strikes or social unrest erupted, 
while the population rose against populism and unjustified 
state privileges. Politically and financially, crony businessmen 
were the biggest losers, whereas the political winners were the 
moderate but resolute center-right forces. The sensible public 
wanted  decisive  action  from  their  leaders  to  resolve  their 
problems. This political economy was reminiscent of the early 
postcommunist transition, when radical reform and democ-
racy  went  hand  in  hand.  The  ideological  wind  was  clearly 
liberal and free market but also socially responsible, favoring 
a somewhat purer market economy and a moderate retrench-
ment of the social welfare state. East Europeans did not object 
to the welfare state as such, but they wanted social welfare 
to be trimmed, to become more efficient, and to work for 
those truly in need rather than being diverted to the wealthy. 
It has proven politically possible to cut public expenditures, 
salaries, and employment, as well as rationalize health care and 
education. 
In  the  end,  this  crisis  will  likely  benefit  both  Eastern 
and Western Europe and thus the European Union. Western 
Europe will have to learn from Eastern Europe, erasing the 
current  division  between  first-  and  second-class  members 
within  the  European  Union.  The  East  European  countries 
have persistently had much higher growth rates than the West 
European  countries,  and  economic  convergence  between 
them in terms of GDP per capita has been impressive for the 
last nearly two decades. Thanks to the East Europeans, the 
West Europeans have slashed their corporate profit tax rates 
and have also been enticed to liberalize their labor markets. 
Now, they will also learn fiscal policy from the east. Rather 
than being the laggards, the East Europeans will be the leaders 
in economic policymaking. 
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Figure 3     Latvia’s fiscal consolidation, 2008–11
percent of GDP
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